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In this issue...
Fundamental east-west synergies in electricity generation and
transmission are waiting to be more fully exploited. Doing so would
require provinces to rethink their electricity trading relationships
with each other and with the United States.
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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONCanadians are in the enviable position of living in a country richly endowed with energy
resources, especially regarding electricity. Nature has fortuitously located hydroelectric, gas,
oil, coal and nuclear resources in an alternating pattern across the country, which creates
natural synergies for east-west trade. Yet it seems like man has purposely conspired to
undermine these natural facilitators of interprovincial electricity trade by putting in place
another alternating pattern of monopoly and competitive commercial structures and public
and private ownership that erects trade barriers at virtually every provincial border.
To ensure ongoing access to US markets, most Canadian provinces have complied with US
laws that require reciprocal arrangements for transmission between neighbours. Because they
allow large, provincial-owned utilities to control access, these transmission policies have
resulted in provinces with competitive electricity markets, where electricity customers can
choose their suppliers (Alberta and Ontario), being unable to share the benefits of trade with
their neighbouring monopoly utilities.
Canada needs “Made-in-Canada” electricity policies that discourage monopolization of
transmission access and allow provinces to equitably and fairly trade with each other
regardless of market structures. To realize the national scope of Canada’s electricity resources,
provincial commercial and transmission policies for electricity must be reformed to
accommodate the Canadian reality, which is a patchwork of competitive markets and
monopoly utilities.
Given that electricity policy is almost wholly a provincial responsibility, most of the initiatives
this Commentary recommends are for provincial action. Provinces should:
￿ adopt policies for allocating transmission capacity on intertie lines between provinces
whereby each province establishes the rules for allocating 50 percent of the capacity in
each direction;
￿ adopt rules that encourage electricity importers and exporters to use longer-term
contracts and discourage their use of the shorter-term, real-time market; and
￿ adopt policies that ensure that all electricity customers are represented in the longer-
term market including the appointment of “load serving entities” to manage the supply
needs for those customers who choose not to select their own suppliers.
One recommendation requires federal support of provincial initiatives as follows:
￿ provinces who design their own rules for increasing interprovincial trade in ways that
do not comply with the reciprocity provisions required by the US Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission should be supported by the federal government in a NAFTA
challenge to protect their right to continue to buy and sell electricity in US markets.
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C
anada could benefit from
increased interprovincial trade in
electricity, which would result in
increased integration among the existing
provincial electricity systems. The
stumbling block is the inability to realize
and equitably allocate economic benefits
among transacting provinces.
While electricity transmission infrastructure is also
lacking, new facilities cannot be justified in the
absence of economic benefits to all the parties
involved in each transaction. To facilitate increased
interprovincial electricity trade, therefore, the focus
should be on modifying the electricity sector’s
commercial structures. It is these commercial
structures that would realize and allocate the
inherent economic benefits that, in turn, would
support any necessary investment in infrastructure.
Most Canadian provinces have adopted US
transmission policies to ensure access to the US
market. However, significant differences between the
US and Canada in the legal and commercial structure
of the electricity industry mean that a “Made-in-
Canada” approach to regional integration is required
rather than the continued adoption of US approaches.
In this reform, there is limited scope for a federal role.
Initiatives have to be taken by various provinces to
overcome significant differences – with respect to public
versus private ownership and competitive versus
monopoly commercial structures – between their
electricity systems and those of their prospective trading
partners. Moreover, the onus will fall on those provinces
with competitive commercial structures for their
electricity systems to lead the way.
Provinces should establish mechanisms that 
(i) allocate interprovincial transmission capacity such
that no party can monopolize it; (ii) realize and equi-
tably distribute the economic benefits of interprovin-
cial trade; and (iii) ensure that a “Made-in-Canada”
approach does not threaten existing US trade. 
Existing Patterns in Electricity Trade
and Infrastructure
Even to a casual observer, the map of major electric
transmission facilities in North America (Figure 1)
shows a major distinction between Canada and the
United States. Whereas the US is served by what can
truly be called a grid of lines interconnecting various
areas of the country in all directions, Canada’s
transmission system is oriented north-south.
Moreover, trade in electricity between Canada and
the United States is considerably larger than
interprovincial trade. In 2008, international trade
(exports plus imports) was 78,800 gigawatt hours
(GWh), while interprovincial trade was 52,900 GWh
(Figure 2). The Churchill Falls generating station in
Labrador, which primarily supplies the Quebec
electricity system,
1 alone accounts for 60 percent of
Canada’s interprovincial electricity trade. Excluding
this Labrador-to-Quebec transfer leaves a total
“discretionary” interprovincial trade of 21,500 GWh,
just 27 percent of the volume of international trade
in 2008. That year, Canada’s exports of electricity to
the United States were worth $3.8 billion, while its
imports amounted to $1.3 billion, for a net of $2.5
billion in export revenue, equivalent to 9 percent of
the $26.1 billion gross revenue of Canada’s electricity
sector (National Energy Board 2008). By
comparison, although statistics are not kept
nationally on the value of interprovincial electricity
trade, prorating from the 2008 production of
598,800 GWh by half of the 21,500 GWh of
interprovincial trade (since an export from one
province is an import to another) indicates an
interprovincial value of just $0.5 billion annually.
It appears, therefore, that Canada has pursued
international electricity trade in preference to
interprovincial electricity trade.
Infrastructure: Cause or Effect?
While trade cannot happen without appropriate
transmission infrastructure, it must be concluded
that any infrastructure deficit is the result, rather
Independent • Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
The analysis, views, conclusions and recommendations in this Commentary are entirely my own and should not be considered as representing
those of either my former employers, including the Ontario Power Authority and the Ontario Energy Board, or organizations on whose
boards I presently serve, including the Alberta Electric System Operator.
No topic as complex as interprovincial electricity trade can be examined adequately by a single mind and I have benefitted greatly from
observations, information, suggestions and assistance from many people across Canada who have contributed from their considerable
professional experience both directly and in reviewing drafts of this Commentary.
1 Churchill Falls serves some load in Labrador, but of the 34,800 GWh generated in 2008, 31,400 GWh (90 percent) was exported to Quebec.| 2 Commentary 306
than the cause, of limited trading potential. There
are some formidable physical barriers to east-west
transmission lines – the Great Lakes, sparsely
inhabited areas between major urban centres, and
major mountain ranges – which raise the cost of
the necessary transmission infrastructure. But
transmission costs are more sensitive to distance
than they are to the particular terrain involved. As
well, since transmission costs average around 15 to
20 percent of a typical electricity bill, the
economic impact of higher transmission costs
related to difficult terrain and sparse population
are proportionately diluted. Therefore, while high
transmission costs rule out some seemingly
worthwhile opportunities for interprovincial
trade, many others are still feasible, so that, over
time, the pattern of transmission lines will develop
to follow the preferred pattern of economically
justifiable trading (Carr 1999).
A recent report by the Canadian Academy of
Engineering (2010) underscores these
observations and identifies the motivations for
increased interprovincial trade. It suggests that
“current business practices” do not support
investment in interprovincial transmission projects
and that federal subsidies or incentives are
necessary to make such projects feasible. In
contrast, this Commentary takes the view that
investment in transmission infrastructure should
be made only if there are net economic benefits
and even then only if commercial arrangements
are aligned to realize and fairly allocate the costs
and benefits.
C.D. Howe Institute
Figure 1: Major Electric Transmission Lines in North America 
Note: Lines shown are 345kV and above. There are numerous interconnections between Canada and the US under 345kV that do not appear on this map.
Source: Canadian Electricity Association (CEA). Map copyright of CEA. Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
Sources of Value in Electricity Trade 
Canada’s geographic distribution of energy sources
provides an opportunity unique in the world for
developing an electricity supply that is both robust
and economic. 
Long-Term Planning Benefits
Electrically, Canada consists of three regions
dominated by hydroelectric generation separated
by regions dominated by fossil- or nuclear-fuelled
generation.
2Three provinces (British Columbia,
Manitoba, and Quebec) have extensive
hydroelectric resources that allow storage of energy
in the form of water impounded in reservoirs, and
each has at least one neighbour that relies heavily
on fossil- or nuclear-fuelled generating capacity.
The weakness of hydroelectricity is that the
amount of energy available is limited by the
volume of water available, which, in turn, is
subject to unpredictable fluctuations in
precipitation over the years. Generating systems in
the “hydroelectric provinces” historically have been
sized to ensure that there is adequate energy
available under worst-case precipitation conditions.
This means that they have inherently installed
capacity in excess of the maximum in-province
peak demand. In contrast, “fuelled” generation
that uses coal, natural gas, or uranium can produce
energy on demand. Accordingly, fuelled systems
are sized to ensure that maximum peak demand
can be met. This means that they inherently have
Commentary 306 | 3
2 Mainland Labrador and the island of Newfoundland could also be added to this list as a hydro-fossil pair within the single province of
Newfoundland and Labrador.
Figure 2: International and Interprovincial Transfers of Electricity – 2008 (GWh)
Note: Data for interprovincial transfers of electricity are from January 1, 2008 to Deember 31, 2008 and are compiled from Statistics Canada’s Electric Power
Statistics, Monthly (megawatt hour) table. Data for US imports and exports are for 2008 (excludes exchanges) and are compiled by the NEB (National
Energy Board). Arrows indicate import/export transactions and may not represent the actual electricity flow route from source to destination.
Source: National Energy Board (NEB).C.D. Howe Institute
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the ability to produce more energy than is needed
in-province. In electricity industry parlance,
hydroelectric systems are “energy limited” while
fuelled systems are “capacity limited.”
Major economic benefits can result if the long-
term development of both types of systems –
hydroelectric and fuelled – is integrated, thereby
reducing the capital invested in each. Integrated
development would make it more economical for
one province’s energy-limited hydro system to
import some of the energy surplus available from
a neighbouring province’s fuelled system than to
build and operate to ensure energy self-sufficiency.
At the same time, it would be more economical
for the capacity-limited fuelled system to import
some of the capacity surplus available from the
neighbouring hydroelectric system than to build
and operate to ensure capacity self-sufficiency.
Short-Term Operational Benefits
Even without integrated planning and investment,
there are economic benefits to be gained by
coordinating the operation of hydroelectric and
fuelled systems that have been built for separate
self-sufficiency. The hydroelectric system’s storage
capability allows it to import fuelled generation
off peak, when it is in surplus and therefore low in
value, and to save hydroelectric energy for peak
times, when it has higher value. 
In addition to this, there are often other
operational synergies that come into play – such
as taking advantage of the different timing of peak
demands between systems in different time zones
to reduce the running time of the most expensive
generation, which is often also the least efficient
generation. Exploiting time zone diversity has an
east-west, rather than a north-south axis, making
the advantage more important for interprovincial
than for international trade.
A similar situation exists with respect to seasonal
diversity, since all provinces except Ontario
experience their peak electricity requirements in
winter (Canadian Academy of Engineering 2010).
Of course, seasonal diversity might have stronger
north-south benefits and therefore be more
favourable to international than to interprovincial
trade; even within Ontario, electricity demand in
the northern part of the province peaks in winter
while in the south it peaks in the summer. 
Untapped International Synergies
Most provinces import very little electricity from
the United States compared to their exports there.
The large differences between export and import
volumes for most provinces with international
trade indicate that little advantage is being taken
of the synergies between different types of
generation. Across the border from both Manitoba
and Quebec, which have almost exclusively
hydroelectric generation, the US electricity
systems are basically fuelled systems using coal,
natural gas, or nuclear. 
In contrast, British Columbia has a very large
trading volume with the United States in both
directions. This might seem surprising, since the
generating mix immediately south of the border is
quite similar to British Columbia’s and as a result
there is a relatively less diversity among generation
types to exploit. However, major transmission
interconnections connect the US Pacific
Northwest and California, which is supplied
largely by coal, gas and nuclear generation. So in
fact, the aggregate US market accessed from
British Columbia has a generation mix that is
complementary to its own.
The remaining provinces with direct transmis-
sion connections to the US – Saskatchewan,
Ontario and New Brunswick – also face
generation portfolios across the border that are
quite similar to their own but, unlike the case for
British Columbia, this is reflected both in their
modest trading volumes and their bias toward
trade in one direction compared to the other.
The Interprovincial Imperative
The single national legal, financial, and political
framework within which all provincial electricity
systems work should also facilitate coordination of
both long-term plans and shorter-term operations.
All else being equal, the relative ease of
interprovincial coordination compared with
international coordination should result in east-
west trade being more attractive than north-south
trade. The fact that the north-south trade is
dominant indicates that all else is not equal.Commentary 306 | 5
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International and Interprovincial Price
Differences
Of course, international trade would dominate
interprovincial trade if US electricity prices were
generally higher than Canadian prices – as they
are. But the input costs of electricity generation –
fuel, machinery, capital, labour – are not
fundamentally different on either side of the
border because they are priced either by global
markets or in the context of the broader
economies of the two countries. Those broader
economies are kept in long-term alignment by
innumerable well-entrenched interdependencies.
Any sustained pricing differences across the
border must therefore result from differences in
the commercial structures of the electricity
industry. This could include implicit subsidies of
Canadian electricity prices through such things as
below-market return on investment and the non-
taxable status of the publicly owned utilities that
dominate Canada’s electricity sector. But even if
such factors encourage trade in the direction of
the international border, they do not detract from
the economic advantages that could be simulta-
neously available from increased interprovincial
trade. Fundamental east-west synergies exist that
are waiting to be more fully exploited, and doing
so need not result in diminished north-south
trade.
Energy Policy and Trade Barriers 
Beyond this intuitive economic rationale, there are
other motives for increasing the level of interprovin-
cial electricity trading. Key among these is the fact
that energy is taking on a new significance in
government policies in virtually every country in the
world. Electricity, as one of the most flexible,
essential, and ubiquitous forms of energy, holds a
special spot in those energy policies (see Carr 2010).
There are also important reasons to reduce
interprovincial trade barriers in general. The
recent exemption for Canadian businesses from
the “Buy American” provisions in US economic
stimulus programs resulted directly from the
provinces agreeing to remove their individual
trade barriers. Interprovincial trade barriers have
also been cited as obstacles to a European Union-
Canada trade deal (see McCarthy 2010). As well,
the recovery initiatives spawned by the 2008/09
global economic crisis have raised consciousness of
protectionism and stimulated widespread “no
barriers” discussions. At a time when Canada’s
sentiments lie in the direction of trade
liberalization, continued provincial isolation in
electricity policy is an anachronism.
National Renewable Energy Resources 
Another factor driving interest in a more integrated
national approach to electricity is public concern
about climate change. This has resulted in a desire
to integrate more renewable resources – particularly,
wind – into the supply mix. As well, the value of
expanding the use of electricity and integrating the
use of renewable generating resources over wider
geographic regions has been recognized in a recent
study (Pembina Institute and the David Suzuki
Foundation 2009) of the economic impact of
climate change policies. It appears that resulting
discussions about increased interprovincial
transmission initiatives are ongoing.
3
Because wind power is intermittent, however,
there is increased awareness of the just-in-time
nature of electricity and the important role that
storage and the exploitation of time-zone
differences for diversity in peak demand could
play. Electricity systems covering bigger geographic
areas would be useful in maximizing the use of
renewable sources such as solar and wind. To some
degree, the intermittency of these sources is
statistically smaller when localized variations in
sunlight and wind levels are averaged over larger
geographic areas (Adams and Cadieux 2009).
Concerns about climate change have also raised
awareness of the different sources of raw energy
that are used in various provinces and the oppor-
tunities this might present, such as Ontario using
hydroelectric power from Labrador instead of
building new nuclear generation.
In summary, there is an increased awareness 
of the value of having a mixed portfolio of supply
sources for electricity and the potential for
achieving that across Canada through
interprovincial electricity trade.
3 See, for example, Jeffrey Simpson, “Canada suffers for its energy incoherence,” The Globe and Mail, April 23, 2010.4 The Tennessee Valley Authority is one such exception. Founded in 1933 by the federal government to stimulate the regional economy in the
wake of the Great Depression, one of the TVA’s major roles is electricity generation.
5 Many provinces also subdivided for the local distribution of electricity by utilities that often are owned and operated by local municipalities. In
the 1990s, Ontario had more than three hundred such local distribution utilities, delivering in aggregate about three-quarters of the province’s
electricity to end users.
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Electricity System Development in
Canada and the United States
There are historic roots to some of the factors
important to the patterns of electricity trade in
Canada and the United States. An awareness of this
history, and its different course in the two countries, 
is key to designing any initiative to facilitate interpro-
vincial electricity trade. Chief among these different
histories is that, in Canada, electricity is a provincial
responsibility, while in the US, law and custom give
the federal government a significant role. This
allocation of responsibilities to the provincial level has
been reinforced by several factors, discussed below,
with the result that provincial boundaries define the
Canadian electricity industry to a far greater extent
than do state boundaries in the United States.
Provincial Self-Sufficiency
Electricity is an intermediate form of energy and
most provinces have raw energy resources to operate
generators whereas most states do not. British
Columbia, Manitoba, and Quebec have adequate
water to supply virtually their entire electricity
requirements; the island of Newfoundland,
Saskatchewan, Ontario, and New Brunswick have
enough hydroelectric power for around 25 percent;
Saskatchewan and Ontario have uranium; and
Alberta, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan can call on
significant coal and natural gas resources. When
electricity systems were first built, energy self-
sufficiency was a realistic option for most provinces
and remains so to this day for the majority. Energy
resources in the US are much less evenly distributed
with the vast majority of states being either major
importers or major exporters of raw energy resources.
Public Ownership
In turn, provincial energy self-sufficiency, along
with a generally more socialized approach to life in
Canada, led to political support for the public
ownership of electric utilities to a far greater
degree than in the United States. With a few
notable and stand-alone exceptions,
4 electricity 
development in the United States proceeded along
strictly commercial lines, with basically no social
agenda or influence. Thus, US urban centres were
electrified with the most economical source of
energy and connected to other urban centres and
sources as economics dictated and without regard
for state lines or regional energy self-sufficiency.
In contrast, Canada’s electricity systems developed
in the context of public ownership, more widely
separated urban centres, and regional supplies of raw
energy. Commercial factors were at once weaker and
less important politically than leveraging provincial
resources for provincial betterment. So far from there
being a spirit of interprovincial sharing in electricity,
there tends to be one of competition and of
safeguarding competitive advantages. Self-sufficiency
remains a goal of British Columbia’s most recent
energy policy (British Columbia 2007) even though
its confidence in the value of trading with neighbours
is evident in its becoming Canada’s largest net
importer of electricity both in absolute volume and
relative to in-province production (see Figure 2).
Restructuring for Competition 
Another factor important to any policy changes
related to interprovincial electricity trade is the
commercial structure of the electricity industry: how
investment decisions are guided and how the
revenues are organized. Again, it will become
evident that differences between Canada and the
US, as well as differences among provinces,
constrain alternatives for enhancing interprovincial
electricity trade.
Until 10 or 15 years ago, electricity was provided
under a commercial structure dominated by
vertically integrated utilities. Each utility had a
complete monopoly on all aspects of the production
and delivery of electricity within its service territory.
In Canada, this meant that generation and trans-
mission was operated on a provincial basis; or in
some cases, such as British Columbia, Alberta, and
Newfoundland and Labrador, with provinces
subdivided into two or three service territories, each
with its own generation and transmission utility.
5Beginning in the 1990s, many countries
restructured the commercial arrangements of their
electricity sectors. Each restructuring was unique,
but they all centred on introducing competition
and reducing the extent of monopolies. A typical
electricity sector restructuring involved dismantling
the vertically integrated utility into separate
transmission and distribution companies as well as
a number of generating companies. Customers
were free to buy electricity from whomever they
wished, and the generating companies competed to
supply them.
6The transmission and distribution
“wires” companies remained protected monopolies,
with rates set by a regulatory agency but, as will be
discussed in more detail shortly, with “open access”
obligations to deliver electricity between any
generator and any customer connected to their
systems. Thus, in an electricity system that has been
commercially restructured, the price of electricity is
set by market forces as generators compete for
customers, while the delivery costs are established
through a regulatory process.
Interties and Restructuring
Under the monopoly structure, it was feasible for
interconnections to be built between neighbouring
transmission systems by the simple expedient of the
two monopolies in their respective provinces
agreeing to share the costs and operations of the
“intertie” between them.
7 In effect, both monopolies
could share the benefits of improved integration of
the two systems since each was responsible for the
entire range of electricity services and had complete
control of operations so as to ensure that they both
provided and capitalized on those advantages.
Importantly, as well, the vertically integrated
monopoly structure in the two provinces ensured
that the benefits of interprovincial trade reached
electricity customers in each province. Typically,
arrangements resulted in the sharing of benefits
equally, although one utility might derive benefits
from reduced operating costs for its generators 
while the other might benefit from deferring the
need to invest in new generation. Virtually all the
interprovincial interconnections that exist today
were put in place under this commercial model.
Separating the vertically integrated structure
into separate generation and transmission
elements and having different commercial models
for each creates a much more complex allocation
of costs and benefits. In essence, this Commentary
is motivated by the need to match the new
commercial structures of the electricity sector 
with new methods of allocating the costs and
benefits of interties between provinces.
Electricity Restructuring in Canada and the
United States 
In Canada, Alberta was the first province to
restructure along competitive lines, and is really
the only one to have made the transition
successfully. Ontario followed closely, but quickly
reversed course by suddenly freezing prices in
response to a backlash from consumers, who
reacted to the poorly thought out arrangements
for setting retail prices (Carr 2003); competition
has had a decreasing influence on the setting of
electricity prices in Ontario ever since.
In the United States, electricity restructuring
had a strong federal involvement, with the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
exercising its authority over interstate trade. 
This federal involvement brought a measure of
uniformity of approach, but the focus on inter-
state affairs meant that uniformity was restricted
to transmission and wholesale matters.
Specifically, with respect to open-access transmis-
sion, FERC implemented reciprocity provisions
8 and
issued a model, or “pro forma,” open-access
transmission tariff (OATT).
9 Under the reciprocity
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6 There are many detailed variants of the basic restructuring theme of competitively priced supply with regulated delivery prices using open-
access monopoly wires. One of the biggest variations relates to whether retail customers connected to distribution systems are free to choose
their suppliers – retail competition – or whether that choice is available only to large-scale customers connected directly to the transmission
system – wholesale competition. As it relates to interprovincial and international trade, however, this detail is not important in that
interconnections between neighbouring systems always involve only the transmission system.
7 In an electricity system, the term “intertie” or “interconnection” refers to a transmission line that connects to a neighbouring system.
8 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (1996). 
9 A tariff outlines the terms and conditions, including price, under which a service is provided. Thus, an OATT implements a specific policy
on allocating the costs and benefits of transmission capacity to users of the transmission system.10 In the United States, restructuring was undertaken on a widespread basis through a somewhat byzantine combination of federal and state
initiatives. The result is that most electricity users are served competitively but with notable exceptions in areas of traditional low-cost supply,
forming a swath that runs diagonally from the southeast to the northwest.
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provisions, a party is allowed to use the open-access
provisions of a transmission system only if the
jurisdiction they are supplying from or delivering to
has comparable open-access transmission provisions.
While each transmission system developed its own
unique tariff, the FERC pro forma OATT was
universally adopted as the basis on which customized
features were added and modifications made.
This arrangement worked well in the US
context and contributed to harmonizing the
commercial structure and arrangements for
electricity over wide geographic regions.
Importantly as well, the reciprocity requirement
resulted in clearly defined boundaries between
competitive systems that had been restructured and
monopoly systems that had not.
10 It eliminated
economic disconnects at the interface of market-
and non-market-based systems by erecting a
commercial barrier at the border; monopolies 
could not take advantage of their potential to
dominate a neighbouring competitive marketplace.
The Influence of US Policy on
Electricity in Canada
One consequence of the FERC reciprocity
provision was that all the remaining provinces that
had not adopted competitive restructuring for
their own reasons now did so in order to access
US customers. Bearing in mind that for every
province that borders the United States, except
Alberta, international electricity trade (net) in
2008 accounted for about 10 percent or more of
total sales, and as high as 28 percent in Manitoba
(National Energy Board 2008), it can be seen that
compliance with US requirements is a high
priority (see Box 1). In fact, with the exception of
Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward
Island, Ontario, and Alberta, all provinces actually
adopted the FERC pro forma rules and
regulations in developing their own open-access
provisions. Newfoundland and Labrador and
Prince Edward Island have no direct connection
or trade with the United States, while Ontario and
Alberta, being the only provinces that restructured
for purely domestic reasons, chose to design their
own open-access provisions. Thus, most Canadian
electricity systems incorporate commercial
arrangements designed in the US to meet US
policy requirements.
Open-Access Transmission without Competition
Since most provinces did not restructure for
domestic reasons, they have not attempted to give
It is probable that the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) would take legal precedence over FERC regulations
(see Saunders 2001). NAFTA requires "national treatment,"
which falls short of reciprocal treatment. National treatment
allows each country to establish its own commercial rules but
requires that those rules treat foreign companies the same way
as domestic companies. Reciprocal treatment requires, in
contrast, that companies are treated the same way in the
foreign country as they are in their home country. With respect
to electricity, national treatment would allow Canadian
companies to move energy on US transmission systems
because that is what US companies are allowed to do. Under
national treatment, the only grounds for complaint that a US
company might have is if it were not treated the same as a
Canadian company when doing business in Canada. 
But the issue of national versus reciprocal treatment with
respect to electricity transmission arrangements has never
been tested through litigation. While exemptions from
reciprocal treatment were requested with respect to allowing
BC Hydro, Ontario Hydro, and Hydro-Québec to operate in the
United States, FERC stood firm in requiring the three Canadian
systems to provide open access similar to that required in the
United States (Saunders 2001). As a result, every province that
is home to energy companies that trade with the United States
has adopted open-access transmission provisions that comply
with FERC requirements.
Box 1: FERC Reciprocity Requirements and NAFTACommentary 306 | 9
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11 Ontario also adopted the same arrangement, but remote hydroelectric generation is a relatively smaller portion of the province’s overall supply
system, so transmission tariffs are not as heavily burdened as in the other cases.
12  Robert A. Sinclair, testimony on behalf of Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, Régie de l’énergie files, P-110-1565 and P-110-1597, October,
2008.
13  Decision D 2010-053 Régie de l’énergie, May 11, 2010.
14 Part 7, Bill 17-2010, Clean Energy Act, Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, First Reading April 28, 2010.
practical effect to the restructuring. Specifically, they
have not attempted to have internal competition
but instead have preserved a monopoly, single-
supplier arrangement. Under such circumstances,
there is no practical value in having an open-access
transmission system – indeed, as will be seen below,
having one that operates under US rules can actually
be a disadvantage.
In the cases of British Columbia, Manitoba, and
Quebec, it might be said that moves have been
taken to discourage competition by setting very high
rates for the use of the transmission system. All three
hydroelectric provinces have extensive transmission
facilities necessary to tap into generating resources
that are remote from the populated areas where
most of the electricity is used. It is a matter of
interpretation whether many of these long and
expensive transmission facilities are part of the grid,
which all customers should share in paying for, or
whether they are system elements specific to the
particular generators they connect, the cost of which
only the generators should bear. 
Since in all three provinces both generation and
transmission are owned by government, for any
cost-revenue scenario it is not important to
government how the revenues and costs are split
between generation and transmission. As well, since
in-province electricity customers pay the aggregate
of generation plus transmission costs, they too are
substantially indifferent to the allocation of costs
between generation and transmission. But to
external users of the open-access transmission
system who pay only for this use and not for in-
province generation, the classification of facilities
between grid and generation is very significant.
All three provinces, in fact, have adopted the
most expansive definition of “grid,” which
increases the cost of using transmission but
reduces the cost of operating in-province
generators. This choice for allocating transmission
costs means that, while there is open access in a
strict legal sense, each system is a closed monopoly
to all practical commercial intents and purposes.
11
In the case of Quebec, the absence of
meaningful commitment to open-access
transmission was noted in a complaint filed in
respect to Newfoundland and Labrador’s
frustrated attempts to access markets beyond
Quebec from Labrador. An expert witness in the
hearing before Quebec’s regulatory body, La Régie
de l’énergie, stated that Hydro-Québec’s “actions
go beyond the natural inertia of a monopolist and
instead reflect a pro-active effort to inhibit
[Newfoundland and Labrador’s] access to the
grid.”
12 The complaint was decided in favour of
Hydro-Québec
13 but has been appealed in an
unusually strongly worded and comprehensive
fashion that questions no less than 16 “manifest
errors in the interpretation of facts that play a
determining role and that set aside several rules of
law” (Régie de l’énergie 2010).
Any doubts about British Columbia’s
commitment to open-access transmission will be
heightened by recently introduced legislation that
merges the previously separate BC Transmission
Corporation (BCTC) and BC Hydro.
14 BCTC
was formed just seven years ago by separating the
transmission and system dispatch functions from
BC Hydro. The purpose of the separation was to
demonstrate that BC Hydro did not have prefer-
ential access to transmission capacity in British
Columbia and therefore met FERC’s requirements
for being allowed to use US transmission systems
for buying and selling power. While there is no
intention to change the arrangements for
transmission access immediately, it remains to be
seen whether this corporate merger affects the
allocation of transmission capacity in British
Columbia in the longer term. Given the
importance to British Columbia of electricity
trade with the United States, the provincial policy
likely will be to continue to recognize FERC
reciprocity requirements while administering
compliance processes entirely within the vertically
integrated BC Hydro.| 10 Commentary 306
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15 Information on the size, term, and ownership of transmission rights is posted on websites maintained by the relevant electric system operators.
While the information is not confidential, public access is difficult due to cyber-security arrangements on most sites, and interpretation is
challenging due to heavy use of industry jargon and abbreviations. The information provided here was facilitated by a number of electricity
market participants who wish to remain anonymous.
The Allocation of Transmission
Capacity under Open Access
An important factor resulting directly from the
adoption of the US pro forma open-access tariff
by most provinces is the method of allocating
capacity on the transmission system among users. 
Transmission Rights Models 
The US FERC pro forma open-access transmission
tariff is based on a system of transmission capacity
rights that can be bought and sold. In contrast,
both Alberta and Ontario, the two provinces that
restructured for domestic reasons rather than to
ensure continued access to US markets, treat
transmission access as the right of any generator
that has been dispatched to operate by the system
operator. In effect, Alberta and Ontario treat
transmission as a public amenity whereas all other
provinces treat it as a commodity to be bought and
sold – albeit one for which, in some cases, it is not
expected there will be any buyers other than those
owned by the provincial government that owns the
transmission system.
Under the FERC pro forma open-access tariff,
transmission rights are bought and sold basically
through an auction process in which the
availability and price of transmission capacity are
publicly posted and buyers offer to purchase
various classes of service over varying periods of
time (a month, several years). Since the price is
fixed, competition is on the basis of quantity.
Capacity is awarded to the party offering to buy
the largest combinations of capacity for the
longest durations, until all offers are filled or all
available capacity allocated. “Roll-over” provisions
give existing rights holders priority in extending
their duration by allowing them to match any
competing offer. All contracts are “take or pay”
and any rights that are not being used must be
offered for resale.
In Canada, as detailed later, this process of
allocating transmission capacity has led to market
dominance and anti-competitive behaviour at
many of the transmission interties between
provinces. The process is particularly problematic
for interties between neighbouring systems that use
different allocation mechanisms and where one or
more potential rights holders are publicly owned.
In the United States, by contrast, the number of
competitors apparently has been sufficient to avoid
having users exercise market power and dominate
the ownership of transmission rights across
interties. And since US federal law encourages
both sides of an intertie to follow the same pro
forma tariff, users have not found it difficult to
route electricity between adjacent systems.
The Effect of the Exercise of Market Power on
Canadian Interties
Perhaps because many of the open-access
provisions and transmission rights systems put in
place in Canada did not have competitive
electricity markets as their primary objective,
experience in Canada has been quite different
from that in the United States. No attempt
appears to have been made, for example, to limit
the exercise of market power in the acquisition of
rights to access interties in those markets working
under the FERC pro forma tariff.
NEW BRUNSWICK AND HYDRO-QUÉBEC: In the
initial auction process for capacity on a recently
constructed 300 MW intertie between New
Brunswick and Maine, a unit of Hydro-Québec
was allowed to purchase 100 percent of the export
capacity from New Brunswick to Maine for the
next 20 years.
15 Any further use of that capacity,
will therefore, be at the discretion of Hydro-
Québec and dependent on that utility’s short-term
requirements. The capacity available to others is
reduced by the fact that 670 MW of the 700 MW
export capacity on the original intertie is owned
by NB Power through a number of rights
contracts of between 15 and 20 years each. There
may be some policy justification for NB Power
having some priority access in that they have
obligations to serve customers in New BrunswickCommentary 306 | 11
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16 Memorandum of Understanding between the government of New Brunswick and the government of Quebec, October 29, 2009; “Summary of
Agreement on Energy between the governments of Québec and New Brunswick,” January 20, 2010.
17 In addition to the two main interties, which account for 1,000 MW of export capacity between New Brunswick and Maine, two smaller ones
account for an additional 115 MW. Of these, one is rated at 100 MW and serves an isolated area in northern Maine that is not connected into
the US grid.
18 A 50-year reservation is so unusually long that the duration is documented as a comment in the reservation system, which allows a maximum
of 10 years in its standard log.
except when it is realized that these are export
rights and not import rights.
While the entire transaction has since been
cancelled, it is worthwhile examining what effects
Hydro-Québec’s purchase of NB Power assets would
have had on transmission access to the United
States. During the time when the transaction was
still a possibility, most discussion implied that
ownership of the physical transmission
infrastructure made it possible to control imports
and exports between New Brunswick and Maine. In
fact, the initial proposal was amended so that New
Brunswick maintained ownership of transmission
assets, in part, apparently, to calm fears of Hydro-
Québec’s having undue control of the access to US
markets via New Brunswick. However, under the
FERC pro forma tariff, which is the basis for the
open-access transmission tariff in New Brunswick,
access belongs not to the transmission owner but to
the owner of the rights to use that infrastructure.
According to the summary of the amendment to the
memorandum of understanding,
16 Hydro-Québec
would still have obtained the 670 MW of
transmission rights presently owned by NB Power to
export to Maine.
17 Even as amended, the proposed
transaction would therefore have resulted in Hydro-
Québec controlling 970 MW of the 1,000 MW
intertie capacity available for export from New
Brunswick to US markets for the next 15 years.
ONTARIO-QUEBEC ELECTRICITYTRADE: An even more
complex situation exists at the newly built 1,250
MW capacity intertie at the Quebec-Ontario border.
Ontario’s capacity allocation system for interties is
different from that used in Quebec. Under Quebec’s
open-access arrangements, a unit of Hydro-Québec
has acquired 100 percent of the capacity from
Quebec to Ontario for 50 years.
18 Ontario’s capacity
allocation rules do not allow for long-term rights
ownership so, in effect, Quebec’s rules govern access
to the intertie. This apparently is acceptable to
Ontario since the province seems always to have
looked on interties from the perspective of short-
term operational aspects, with little or no attention
given to the longer-term commercial aspects of
importing and exporting. From the perspective of
Ontario’s system operator (the Independent
Electricity System Operator), there is no difference to
the impact on reliability of an import whether it is
assured for one season or one decade. To an investor,
however, there is a significant difference. Due to the
operational focus of Ontario’s intertie reservation
rules, Ontario-based intertie users must use the rights
reservation systems and rules of neighbouring
provinces and states if they want to enter into long-
term contracts with parties outside the province.
Transmission Rights and New Investment in
Transmission
While Ontario’s reservation system might seem
less than ideal, questions should be asked about
the efficacy of the whole rights allocation process
under the FERC pro forma tariff. It is unlikely
that either of the two new interties at the New
Brunswick/Maine and Quebec/Ontario borders
would have been built had somebody not stepped
forward to guarantee their long-term revenues. In
both cases, the respective provincial regulatory
body was able to approve the new investment safe
in the knowledge that it would result in
incremental revenue over an amortization period
long enough to avoid increasing costs to existing
customers of the transmission system.
If market dominance was Hydro-Québec’s
objective, it would have been logical to achieve that
by building control through strategic short-term
commitments. After all, the tariff’s rollover
provisions give incumbent users the right of first
refusal to match any competing offers for rights that
come up for renewal at the end of their term.
Hydro-Québec could argue justifiably that its
willingness to commit to the ownership of long-
term rights was born of the need to get infrastruc-
ture built, without which rights would not exist.| 12 Commentary 306
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19 There are a number of proposals to build direct interconnectors between Alberta and the United States, but these are all “merchant” projects.
Unlike conventional interties, where the physical infrastructure is economically regulated and financed as part of the broader grid, merchant
transmission facilities operate as standalone entities, where financing and the sale of access rights and collection of tolls are handled by the
owner.
20 The rating of transmission lines is a technically complex process that can create a wide range of numbers to fuel legal arguments. In general, a
line in isolation has a higher rating than it does when in the operational context of an integrated power system, so disputes can arise about what
constitutes the most appropriate operational context.
21 Prorating involves the rights of all parties being reduced in proportion to the amount of rights they hold such that the total of all rights does
not exceed the capacity actually available.
22 Of the 305 MW of new rights sold, all but 25 MW were bought by BC Hydro.
23 Robert A. Sinclair, testimony on behalf of Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, Régie de l’énergie files, P-110-1565 and P-110-1597. 
October, 2008.
Further evidence of difficulties with the FERC
tariff can be seen in the United States, where
construction of new transmission has declined
significantly since electricity restructuring was
introduced (Edison Electric Institute 2005). 
In response, US regulators have been giving
transmission owners higher cost-of-capital
allowances (United States Library of Congress
2005). Both of the above examples are indications
of the higher risk involved in committing to
transmission investments under the FERC tariff.
The paradoxical effect of the tariff, which was
intended to stimulate competition, is that the
process of creating new transmission rights
encourages market concentration of those rights. At
least, this is the situation in Canada, where there
are no federal policies or powers related to the
exercise of market power with respect to electricity
transmission as there are in the United States.
The Unintended Consequences of Selling
Transmission Rights
Alberta is the only province bordering the United
States that does not yet have an international
intertie.
19 This would not appear to be a serious
difficulty since there is an intertie between Alberta
and British Columbia and another between
British Columbia and the United States. However,
the section of transmission in British Columbia
between Alberta and the US brings the British
Columbia open-access provisions into play and
there are complaints that these have been used to
block potential Alberta-US trade.
One situation received public scrutiny and was
reversed by the British Columbia Utilities
Commission (BCUC), the provincial energy
regulator (British Columbia Utilities Commission
2009). It involved the transmission owner, British
Columbia Transmission Company (BCTC),
making rights available in excess of the maximum
usable capacity on the British Columbia to Alberta
intertie.
20 Under provisions of the transmission
tariff, which is based on the FERC pro forma, this
action triggered prorating of the rights held by all
rights holders so that total transfers did not exceed
usable capacity.
21 In effect, it discriminated against
out-of-province rights holders, since BC Hydro
bought virtually all of the newly created rights
22
and might be considered an affiliate of BCTC by
virtue of their common ownership by the provincial
government. As a result, BC Hydro’s share of total
capacity increased from 69 percent to 78 percent
but the total capacity available did not increase. In
effect, BC Hydro gained additional transfer
capacity equal to what other users lost in prorating.
As was previously discussed, open access
provisions in British Columbia were adopted
primarily to ensure ongoing eligibility for BC
Hydro generation to access US markets. But
under the FERC pro forma system for allocating
transmission rights British Columbia loses all the
discretion it used to have when allowing outsiders
to use the provincial transmission system to move
electricity between the US and Alberta.
A similar situation appears to exist in Quebec,
where testimony on behalf of the previously
mentioned complaint filed by Newfoundland and
Labrador Hydro
23 paints a picture of a province
struggling to maintain its preferred vertically inte-
grated monopoly electricity system while working
within the rigid procedures for allocating transmission
capacity that were adopted to satisfy US requirements.
From the perspective of British Columbians and
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the unintended consequences that can result from the
extra-jurisdictional reach of FERC.
Public versus Private Ownership
Public versus private ownership appears to
influence the degree to which intertie capacity is
available to potential market participants. In the
case of both the Maine/New Brunswick and
Quebec/Ontario interties, publicly owned Hydro-
Québec has been able to commit to taking a huge
proportion of available capacity rights for long
periods. This represents a considerable commercial
risk since the capacity is take or pay – that is, it
has to be paid for whether it is used or not,
though this risk can be mitigated by selling
unused capacity on the secondary market.
Higher levels of commercial risk require higher
amounts of capital for the guarantees rights
purchasers must provide to the transmission
company. These guarantees, in one way or
another, rely on and affect the purchaser’s
creditworthiness. For most businesses, capital is a
scarce resource and allocating it to the most
productive uses occupies a major part of the
corporate effort. It is on the success of this
allocation effort that the creditworthiness of a
private sector company rests. In contrast, the
creditworthiness of a state-owned entity benefits
greatly from the right of its owner to levy taxes; in
effect, its creditors know that revenue is available
from elsewhere than the business itself.
Either explicitly or implicitly, lenders see
government ownership as insurance against
bankruptcy, and they reflect that view through
more liberal capital financing arrangements for
public companies. Whether this results in higher
credit ratings, cheaper capital, higher borrowing
limits, or some combination, the result is the
ability of a public-sector entity to take on bigger
business risks. This includes committing for larger
blocks of intertie capacity for longer periods of
time than would be possible for an otherwise
similar private-sector entity. Since the allocation of
rights under the FERC pro forma tariff favours
those offering purchase rights with longer periods
of time, public-sector entities have an advantage.
Leapfrogging Neighbours
While most of the discussion in this Commentary
relates to interprovincial trade between adjacent
provinces, there are situations where the synergies
are greater “next door but one.” Thus, the nuclear-
and fossil-fuelled generation in Ontario and the
Maritimes makes them more attractive than
Quebec as markets for Newfoundland and
Labrador’s generation resources in Labrador.
Section 58.4 of the National Energy Board Act
provides that the federal government can
“designate” an interprovincial transmission line,
which effectively would put it under National
Energy Board (NEB), rather than provincial,
regulation. Such a designation would allow a
transmission line to be built between two
provinces separated by a third province even if the
third province did not want the line to be built.
Newfoundland and Labrador, for example, could
use this approach to access markets in Ontario or
New Brunswick should it remain unsuccessful in
obtaining firm transmission rights on the Quebec
system. Presumably, this interprovincial
designation could also be combined with the
NEB’s jurisdiction under section 58.15 of the
NEB Act related to international transmission
lines to designate a transmission line originating
in one province and routed through a neigh-
bouring province to the US border, an approach
that Alberta might pursue to reach US markets 
via British Columbia.
These federal powers of designation under the
NEB Act are clearly designed to ensure that no
province can frustrate the legitimate objectives of
another to access external markets that are not
adjacent. The process for designating transmission
lines that involve more than one province is not
specified in the NEB Act, however, and since none
has so far been designated there are no precedents.
Given that it is a government decision, though,
federal-provincial political considerations would
clearly be involved and the history of provincial
control in electricity matters would make a federal
initiative unlikely. Any such designation process,
therefore, most likely would begin with one or
more provinces petitioning the federal government.
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Asymmetrical Benefits in Interprovincial
Electricity Trade
Ensuring an equitable allocation of intertie
capacity is not the only commercial barrier
impeding electricity trade between neighbouring
provinces. Another important barrier is the
relative advantage a monopoly has in transacting
electricity in a neighbouring competitive market.
The number and size of participants operating in
the competitive market is controlled through rules
and regulations to ensure there is, in fact, compe-
tition. But in Canada such rules and regulations
cannot be imposed outside the province in the
same way as in the United States because in
Canada there is no overarching federal policy or
legal structure that facilitates competition in 
the electricity sector.
When a province adopts a competitive electricity
market and its neighbour does not, a balance must be
struck on the use of the intertie between them. That
balance is between providing adequate protection to
the health of the in-province competitive market, on
the one hand, and capturing a reasonable share of the
economic benefits of interprovincial trade, on the
other. The onus is on the competitive market to
achieve this balance since the monopoly system
inherently captures any economic benefits available to
it. This is because the monopoly can choose among
several potential buyers and sellers in the competitive
market but those in the competitive market have only
one potential customer for imports or exports. In any
marketplace, the chances of arranging a satisfactory
transaction, and hence realizing a benefit from
trading, increase with the number of potential
partners. But, in reverse, market participants have
only one potential partner outside the province,
which restricts both the number and the attractive-
ness of transactions. In such a situation and without
careful design of rules governing imports and exports,
the long-run economic benefit from interprovincial
trade will be disproportionately allocated to the
province with the monopoly structure.
Alberta’s arrangement for electricity trade with its
neighbours is a useful example of one approach to
striking the balance. To ensure internal competition,
Alberta has established special rules that limit the
ability of imports and exports to influence market
price. Neither of Alberta’s provincial neighbours has
restructured for internal competition but both have
adopted FERC-based open-access transmission
tariffs that allow their respective utilities to trade
competitively in external markets.
As in all North American electricity systems with
competitive commercial structures, all transactions
in the Alberta market occur at a single “clearing
price”: all buyers pay the clearing price, and all
sellers receive the clearing price regardless of their
individual bids and offers. All imports to Alberta are
required to offer into the internal market at the
minimum acceptable price of zero and all exports
must bid at the maximum acceptable price, which is
$999.99/MWh. Along with all other sellers and
buyers, both imports and exports are actually settled
at the clearing price, so, in effect, imports agree to
sell at any price above the minimum and exports
agree to buy at any price below the maximum. This
puts them in the position of being price takers,
which means they can influence price only by the
volumes they choose to transact. It also means that
they are at risk of having to accept any price set by
in-province market participants, who are free to
choose both price and volume. This, in turn, results
in volumes of imports and exports that are lower
than they otherwise would be. While this is not the
most desirable result from a broad economic
perspective, it does mitigate some of the competitive
disadvantages of in-province market participants
with respect to a neighbouring monopoly.
The Consequences of Current Interprovincial
Electricity Policy
In summary, interties need trade to justify them and
the relative lack of east-west transmission facilities is
the result of existing barriers to interprovincial
electricity trade. The approach to facilitating
interprovincial electricity trade is not one of “build
it and they will come” but rather one of aligning
commercial benefits between neighbours.
Interprovincial synergies exist that could result in
commercially valuable trade. Most notably three
provinces have extensive hydroelectric resources
that allow storage of energy in the form of water
impounded in reservoirs, and each has at least one
neighbour that relies heavily on fossil- or nuclear-
fuelled generating capacity. As well, time zones
result in east-west time differences in peak
electricity demand and consequent economic
opportunities for sharing generating capacity. Yet
the organization of electricity along provincial lines
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and the absence of a federal mandate to exert a
unifying force inhibit the growth of interprovincial
energy trade. Barriers to interprovincial commercial
trade are further reinforced by the adoption by
most provinces of US commercial structures and
practices that do not match Canadian conditions.
These conditions include, for example, commercial
competition between public and private sector
entities and no mechanisms to prevent the exercise
of market power on intertie capacity.
Recommendations for Provincial
Initiatives
Several initiatives could be undertaken by provinces
to enhance interprovincial electricity trade.
Vertically Integrated Utilities
In the absence of federal regulatory authority for
electricity similar to that of FERC in the United
States, most changes in Canada to facilitate
increased interprovincial electricity trade would
have to be implementable at the provincial level. In
some parts of the country where there is significant
public ownership and limited private ownership,
such changes could happen through bilateral
agreements between neighbours. In effect, these
would be government-to-government
arrangements, although provincially owned utilities
or other appropriate provincial Crown agencies
could be the legal signatories. Such an approach
might be feasible for ties between Saskatchewan
and Manitoba. Quebec – Newfoundland and
Labrador is also a possibility with respect to new
generation development in Labrador. Quebec –
New Brunswick falls in this same category and the
aborted purchase of some NB Power assets by
Hydro-Québec could have achieved many if not all
the benefits of inter-provincial trade by effectively
merging the two provincial systems.
In all of these cases, the electricity sectors in both
provinces involved are, for practical purposes,
publicly owned monopolies. All provinces, except for
Newfoundland and Labrador, have altered their
former vertically integrated structure to ensure that
anybody has the legal right of non-discriminatory
access to their transmission systems. This change has
had no real impact, however, since none has taken
further steps – such as allowing customers a choice of
suppliers – to alter the practical effect of the existing
monopoly structure. The combination of public
ownership and monopoly structure ensures that all
the costs and benefits of interprovincial trade accrue
to the public at large either through their bills as
electricity users or their taxes as owners of the utility.
The allocation of the costs and benefits accruing
from interprovincial trade gets more complex
where there is some combination of private-sector
ownership and multiple independent entities in
the electricity supply chain. In these circumstances,
the costs and benefits are distributed at various
levels throughout the supply chain. Fair allocation
requires either the prescriptive hand of price
regulation or the invisible hand of competition.
Only a federal regulatory arrangement similar to
that in the United States would have sufficient
impartiality to adjudicate electricity trade benefits
between provinces. But the introduction of any
such regulation would be strongly resisted by many
provinces. It therefore appears that, absent two
monopolies that can enter into a bilateral contract,
fair allocation requires that interprovincial trade 
be based on competitive market concepts.
Competitive Electricity Markets
Other than the two pairs of provinces mentioned
above, there are significant differences in commercial
structure between neighbouring provinces as well as
public-private factors. Market-based approaches to
facilitating interprovincial electricity trade will
therefore be essential in the majority of situations.
At issue is how to level the playing field between a
province that has chosen to adopt an open competi-
tive market and a neighbour that has chosen to stay
with a monopoly structure. This is the situation that
exists between British Columbia and Alberta,
Alberta and Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario,
and Ontario and Quebec. The situation also exists
between Quebec and New Brunswick, New
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, and New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia, although to a lesser
extent since both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia
nominally have partial competitive markets. The
regulatory changes associated with the proposed
purchase of NB Power assets by Hydro-Québec
would have significantly altered the context for
interprovincial electricity trade. It remains to be seen
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whether the cancellation of that transaction will
stimulate consideration of a regional approach to
electricity in the Maritimes.
Reciprocal Intertie Capacity Allocations
One approach to enhancing interprovincial
electricity trade would be for one province to
impose reciprocity provisions on another – in
effect, to mimic the provisions FERC imposes in
the United States to foster fair and open interstate
trade. Two types of reciprocity arrangements
might be necessary from the perspective of
participants in the market-based system: one that
ensures equitable access to intertie capacity and
another that ensures the equitable allocation of
economic benefits from electricity trade.
One approach to allocating intertie capacity
would be to have different rules for 50 percent of
the capacity in both directions. For example,
suppose one province had a competitive market
structure and the other had an open-access
transmission tariff and monopoly structure. In
order for both provinces to benefit equally from
the intertie, the province with the competitive
market could allow half the intertie capacity on its
side to be allocated under the non-market
province’s rules in return for the reciprocal right to
allocate half the capacity on the other side
according to competitive-market rules. At the
same time, the competitive-market province
would disallow intertie transactions in excess of 50
percent of intertie capacity unless the other
province agreed to the 50-50 arrangement. In
theory, this could result in a standoff, with the
intertie left idle; in practice, commercial realities
would assure that the non-market province would
accept such an arrangement.
24
The result would be a simpler reservation
system than the current one, where matching
reservations often must be lined up on both sides
of the border using two separate and different
reservation systems in order for a transaction to
proceed. As well, the competitive-market
province’s allocation rules would be designed to
prevent the monopolization of intertie capacity,
which would ensure that no one party could lock
up more than the 50 percent of the intertie
capacity – that is, the portion that would be
allocated under the non-market province’s rules.
Forward Contracting
With respect to equalizing economic benefits from
electricity trade, provinces with competitive
electricity markets could change the way import and
export transactions with non-market neighbours are
treated. For example, the volume of imports and
exports allowed in the real-time spot market could
be limited by requiring or incenting buyers and
sellers to make arrangements through forward
commitments, whereby they agree to exchange
electricity and money at some time in the future –
anywhere from one day to one or more years ahead.
This is in contrast to the real-time spot market
where electricity and money are exchanged at the
time the buyer and seller agree to the transaction
(see Box 2). 
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Trading volume could be shifted to the forward market and away
from the real-time market by the adoption of a market design
similar to that used in the United Kingdom, the essential element
of which is that the price paid to sellers in the real-time market is
lower than the price charged to buyers. Such dual-pricing
discourages trade in the real-time market and makes contracting
in the longer-term forward market comparatively attractive.
The revenue accumulated by the market operator in a dual-
price arrangement could be made equivalent to the costs of
having idle generating capacity available to respond to
momentary and unpredictable variations in electricity use.
Ensuring adequate investment in generation so that this
backup capacity is available has proved to be a major
challenge for many competitive electricity markets. It is often
referred to as the "missing money" problem when revenues to
generators operating in competitive markets are compared to
what they would be had they been determined under a
regulated monopoly arrangement.
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In effect, moving imports and exports to the
forward market takes away the advantage a
monopoly has by virtue of its inherent base of
revenue. Against this long-term revenue assurance,
the monopoly can reap the rewards of taking more
aggressive short-term positions in the more
dynamic competitive marketplace. Put another
way, pressure on participants in the province with
the competitive marketplace to make eleventh-
hour commitments to transactions with a
neighbouring monopoly could be reduced by
confining the monopoly to longer-term future
commitments.
One way to achieve this would be to require that
all import and export transactions be arranged in
the forward market. Such a dictatorial approach,
however, inevitably would reduce both the volume
of trade and opportunities for in-province buyers
and sellers. It would be better to design the in-
province marketplace such that it is dominated by
forward transactions and real-time transactions
play a minor role. Such a marketplace would
involve in-province participants in longer-term
buying and selling commitments more closely
aligned with the commercial time scales of the
external monopoly. Since a participant is
inherently less able to dominate a forward market
than a real-time market,
25 it might be possible to
remove special market rules for imports and
exports. This, in turn, would maximize benefits for
both in-province buyers and in-province sellers. 
Load-Serving Entities
A logical extension of expanding the marketplace
to encourage longer-term forward contracts and to
reduce the role of the real-time market would be
to create load-serving entities (LSEs), which
would be responsible for meeting the needs of
residential and small commercial customers by
acquiring electricity in the wholesale market.
Such entities inherently already exist in places
that have wholesale competition but not retail
competition. They also exist to some extent in the
form of arrangements to supply customers who,
by choice or chance, are not served by a retailer in
places that have introduced retail competition.
The distinguishing feature of a true LSE is that it
actively manages a portfolio of wholesale supply
contracts that includes forward contracts. By
contracting forward in a marketplace that includes
imports and exports, an LSE would capture a
share of the economic value created by
interprovincial trade on behalf of the retail
customers it serves. Unlike most US markets,
none of the Canadian markets have provided for
LSEs. This means that in both Alberta and
Ontario many consumers are basically passive
price takers and do not actively participate in
setting market price by committing to take supply.
Implementing LSEs has a dual benefit with
respect to interprovincial trade. Firstly, it ensures
that all customers, whether or not they choose to
actively take advantage of the competitive
marketplace, will share in any benefits from
interprovincial trade because it ensures that all
customers are actively represented in the
marketplace where importing and exporting is
being arranged. Secondly, LSEs will participate in
the forward market in order to reduce their
exposure to price volatility. By so doing, they add
depth to the forward market which will enhance
both the role of interprovincial trade and reinforce
the ability of the competitively restructured
province to realize its fair share of economic
benefits from interprovincial electricity trade.
A Recommended National Initiative
Canada is in the unique situation among leading
industrialized nations both for being energy-self
sufficient and for not having a national electricity
policy. Thanks to the massive disruptions to
business and individuals which resulted from
interprovincial wealth transfers under Canada’s
1980 National Energy Program, the concept of an
energy-related national policy will be an anathema
to most Canadians and probably all politicians.
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Looking without envy across the border to the
very complex political and legal issues resulting
from the involvement of both federal and state
levels of government in US electricity, the
Canadian electricity industry too has never been
enthusiastic about an increased role for Ottawa.
But due to a lack of any nationwide vision
about electricity the Canadian electricity industry
is tying itself in knots with the implementation of
interprovincial trade. The situations at the British
Columbia-Alberta and the Quebec-Ontario
borders exemplify the difficulties. All parties have
clear and justifiable provincial policies but they
don’t mesh.
The main unifying influences are, in fact,
coming from the US through the reciprocity
provisions of FERC. But the FERC provisions and
pro forma tariff reflect a US national policy of
fostering competition in the electricity industry. No
such policy exists in Canada and is unlikely to
appear because many provinces eschew the notion
of a competitive electricity sector. Yet these same
provinces adopt open-access policies and follow the
FERC pro forma tariff. Small wonder then that
difficulties occur when policies based on a
monopoly structure are implemented with tools
designed to foster competition.
Through its reciprocity provisions, the FERC
approach builds barriers to trade between electricity
systems which have competitive commercial
structures and those that don’t.   Canada needs a
process that allows interprovincial trade without
reciprocity so that trade can occur fairly between
provinces that have adopted a competitive market
and their neighbours who haven’t.
NAFTA Challenge of US Reciprocity Rules
One initiative with national value would be to
design an interface between market and non-
market systems that facilitates trade by enabling a
fair allocation of trading benefits. To preserve
existing arrangements for accessing US markets it
may also be necessary to pursue under NAFTA
removal of the FERC requirement for reciprocal
treatment.
An extensive analysis and commentary on this
(Saunders 2001) concludes that through a series of
decisions involving Quebec, Ontario and British
Columbia FERC “…was overruling the principle of
national treatment set out in the NAFTA (and the
GATT) and replacing it with the principle of
reciprocity. Put differently, it was replacing the
principle of free trade with the principle of fair
trade, with FERC as the adjudicator of what is fair.”
Indications that there may be room for
arranging international trade in a fashion that
better accommodates interprovincial trade is
contained in a statement by FERC itself quoted
recently by the British Columbia Utilities
Commission (2009): “The Commission’s concern
is not transmission service to serve Canadian loads
– it is transmission to serve United States loads.”
Indeed, as already demonstrated by the separate
and different approaches to transmission in both
Alberta and Ontario, obtaining access to US
markets with FERC’s blessing does not require the
use of a tariff based on the FERC pro forma.
Any two provinces that could mutually benefit
from improved arrangements for interprovincial
trade in electricity could join forces to develop the
policy, regulatory and commercial parameters that
best fit their separate and mutual needs. If the
resulting proposal fails to get assurance from
FERC of unchanged access to US markets,
appropriate steps could be initiated by the federal
government under NAFTA. As already pointed
out, the alternating pattern across Canada of
competitive and non-competitive electricity
systems yields many potential provincial pairings
to take this initiative but obvious ones are Alberta-
British Columbia and Ontario-Quebec.
Conclusion
Canadians are in the enviable position of living 
in a country richly endowed with energy resources
at a time when the world is struggling with the
challenges of meeting the energy needs of a
modern economy in a way that is both economi-
cally and environmentally sustainable. There are
clear opportunities to realize our national
potential through increased interprovincial trading
in electricity.
Nature has fortuitously located hydroelectric,
gas, oil, coal, and nuclear resources in an alterna-
ting pattern across the country, and the daily east-
to-west transit of the sun creates timing diversity
between neighbours’ patterns of electricity use. Yet
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it seems as though humans have purposely
conspired to undermine these natural facilitators
of interprovincial trade by putting in place
another alternating pattern of monopoly and
competitive commercial structures and public and
private ownership that effectively erects trade
barriers at virtually every provincial border. 
This manmade obstacle course is made all the
more difficult by provinces with monopoly
electricity systems having based their transmission
arrangements on a US model. Designed as part of
an overarching US policy to encourage the
nationwide adoption of competitive electricity
markets, these US transmission tariffs are entirely
out of place in Canada, where the national policy
defaults to being the sum total of individual
provincial policies, few of which embrace
competition. Realizing the economic benefits that
could result from an increase in interprovincial
electricity trade will require developing
interchange arrangements that fit the Canadian
reality.  That is, arrangements that facilitate
bilateral transactions between electricity systems
that are organized as vertically integrated
monopolies, and neighbouring ones that have
been commercially restructured for competitive
supply and customer choice.
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